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Innovation and Growth in the Knowledge-based Economy 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
If capital stock is considered in a broad sense, to include both physical and intellectual capital, the 
law of diminishing returns may not apply and the higher the investments in intangible assets the 
higher a country’s growth rate. The so-called AK growth models by taking into account both 
tangible and intangible capital do succeed to establish a positive relationship between growth rate 
and the capital stock. The empirical studies confirm this relationship but they fail to make an 
explicit account of the contribution of intangible capital to growth. This stems from the fact that 
lots of investments in intellectual capital and other intangible assets are not counted as such in 
national income and product accounts. The development of the AK models help to identify the 
neglected elements of growth and show the importance of taking them explicitly into account in 
order to better explain the current growth rates of the new economy. 
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Innovation and Growth in the Knowledge-based Economy  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
It is well documented that a country’s growth and development depend on its ability to 
create wealth over time. A country’s endowment in natural resources was considered to 
provide a competitive advantage over countries with less of such resources. It was rapidly 
recognised though that a nation’s ability to use efficiently its scarce resources was even 
more important than its abundance in resources. Countries such as Japan and Germany 
managed to enjoy high growth rates even though they were not rich in resources. Their 
capacity to shift resources from low-added-value goods and services to high-added-value 
activities allowed them to enjoy double-digit growth rates during the post war period. 
Lately, however, their economic wealth is wrapped up in the so-called “fourth-wave” 
know-how, that is in electrical machinery, motor cars and metal-bashing industries. 
Presently, these countries face lots of difficulties in shifting investments from old, 
relatively low-added-value hardware strengths to new, high-added-value software 
opportunities and reap the benefits arising from investments in converging industries 
such as computing, telecommunications and content industries.  
 
 
Countries with a strong service sector and long tradition in microchip design, in R&D 
infrastructure, in abundance of venture capital, entrepreneurial reward and marketing 
services are better placed to get advantage of this “new wave of innovation” already 
underway in the U.S. and some other industrialised countries. Apparently, developing 
countries are facing enormous difficulties in leapfrogging into this new wave of 
innovations, knowledge creation and sustained growth rates. Are we really at the late 
stage of  the current innovation wave? Do latecomers have any chances in matching the 
performance of most developed countries, especially the U.S.? Can local and national 
governments launch catch-up programmes in innovation and knowledge creation to 
imitate the U.S. performance? Do these programmes really work? Do investments in the 
“new economy” and programmes which promote the knowledge-based sectors really 
contribute to the development of a new infrastructure that will enable the economies to 
realise high growth rates and economic prosperity? 
 
 
Section II describes briefly the new economy, its knowledge-based industries and their 
contribution to employment, productivity gains and economic growth. It highlights the 
importance of these industries in manufacturing and the service sectors in the economy 
and traces some trends. Section III summarises recent advances in growth theory linking 
the stock of capital defined in broad sense (human and physical capital) to economic 
growth. The latter is endogenous ly determined according to the so-called AK growth 
models. These models are based on the assumption that returns to capital do not diminish 
as the capital stock increases. Although investment in physical capital is still important to 
explain growth, we argue that investments in human capital and other intangible assets 
that create knowledge and intellectual capital are even more important in the current 
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globalised context of the new economy. Section IV draws some conclusions and offers 
policy recommendations. 
 
 
II.  The New Economy and the Knowledge-based Sector  
 
 
Many countries, especially the industrialised ones are increasingly becoming knowledge-
based through research and development and systematic pursue of innovative activities in 
industries such as biotechnology, information, telecommunications and computers. The 
creation of intellectual capital  is increasingly deemed as the most valuable asset of a 
firm, the one that creates wealth by increasing productivity gains and by bringing more 
changes in product and production techniques as well as in the organisation of the work 
within the production unit. The creation of intellectual capital gives rise to an increase in 
the intangible assets of the organisation that implements such changes and with it more 
value to its stakeholders.  
 
 
One way to measure the importance of intellectual capital is thus to consider the value of 
intangible assets incorporated into a firm’s value. A firm’s market value is getting 
increasingly higher as its base in intangible assets increases. Firms with higher valuable 
intangible assets will have higher market to book values.   The ratio of the market value 
of the firm to the replacement cost of capital, called Tobin Q ratio, is a good measure of 
the importance intangible capital occupies within an organisation. The higher the ratio the 
higher the importance of intangible assets and therefore the higher the value of  the 
intellectual capital.   High tech firms and firms in other knowledge-based industries 
should have high Tobin Q ratios. An economy dominated by knowledge-based industries 
should have a global Tobin Q ratio  higher than the one of less knowledge-based 
dominated countries. Further still, investment in intangible assets increases the prospects 
for profits and the latter increase the market value of the firm (and the country). The 
higher the value the bigger the incentive for firms to invest more in intangibles and other 
R&D activities.  
 
 
This is precisely what is currently going on in the U.S. and other industrialised countries. 
In the U.S., R&D expenditures have been rising rapidly in the past decade or so. Data 
show that R&D expenditures as a percentage of  non financial corporate gross domestic 
product (GDP) have more than doubled since 19531. By contrast, investments in tangible 
assets (plant and equipment) was more or less stable during the same period (1953-1997). 
Table 1 illustrates the point. 
 
 
                                                                 
1 Not all expenses in intangibles are counted as investments in either the U.S. companies’ financial 
accounts or the U.S. national income and product accounts. As more and more firms invest their cash flow 
in intangible assets this practice leads to an underestimation of corporate profits and renders the explanation 
of the economic and financial performance of the U.S. economy less comprehensive.  
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Table 1 
R&D and Investment in tangible Assets of non financial U.S. corporations (1953-97) 
 
Period R&D (%) 
 
(1) 
Fixed tangible 
investment (%) 
(2) 
R&D and Tangible 
Investment 
(3) 
Advertising 
Expenditures 
(%) 
1953-59 1.3 12.6 13.9 4.2 
1960-69 1.7 12.7 14.4 3.9 
1970-79 1.8 13.9 15.7 3.4 
1980-89 2.3 14.1 16.4 3.9 
1990-97 2.9 12.6 15.5 4.1 
 
Source: Nakamara, L. (1999) 
 
 
The ever increasing proportion of investments in intangibles as a proportion of GDP 
explains the high price/earnings ratios of  many firms in the knowledge-based sectors of 
the economy. Normally, and over longer periods of time profits have tended to grow at 
the same rate as the economy as a whole. Lately, profits are growing at a higher rate than 
the economy because investments in intangibles and other R&D activities reduce 
measured current profits and raise expected future profits. Future profits are expected to 
grow because investment in intangibles create the belief that more products will be 
discovered and these will create more opportunities for market niches development and 
the realisation of further profits. Investments in intangibles and innovations arising out of 
them create positive anticipations on future profitability. Economies with a strong hold 
on the knowledge-based industries enjoy higher returns and increasing wealth.  
 
 
Table 2 
Profits and Stock Market Value of Non Financial U.S. Corporations (1953-97) 
  
Period After-tax book profits (%) 
(1) 
Stock market value (%) 
(2) 
Price-Earnings Ratio 
(2)/(1) 
1953-59 8.8 110 12.56 
1960-69 8.3 145 17.48 
1970-79 7.7 92 11.90 
1980-89 5.2 75 14.55 
1990-97 6.3 127 20.21 
 
Source: Nakamara, L. (1999) 
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Productivity gains are important and they are considered to be the cause of rising wealth.  
Productivity has been growing in the past few years and it is higher in the knowledge-
based industries compared to the traditional ones, although important spill over effects 
may explain the production gains in the economy as a whole. The same is true for 
employment growth and value-added per capital stock and per employed worker. Table 3 
shows the growing importance of the knowledge-based industries in Canada in terms of 
employment, total factor productivity and value-added per capital for the years 1984-97. 
 
 
Table 3 
Average Annual Employment, Total Factor Productivity, and value -added Growth 
Rates in Canadian Manufacturing Industries by Level of Knowledge Intens ity 
 
Industries by 
knowledge 
Employment growth 
rate, 1971-91 (%) 
Total factor productivity, 
1976-98 
Value-added per capital 
stock, 1984-97 
High- 1.16 3.73 1.93 
Medium- 0.21 1.10 -0.71 
Low- -0.25 -0.04 -2.14 
All  0.30 1.55 -0.27 
Source: Gera and Massé, (1996), CSLS, (1999) as referred to http://www.usherb.ca/ceref and 
compilations by the author. 
 
 
For the Canadian economy a major part of employment growth has been attributed to 
trade, especially after the 1980s. Trade was also identified as the catalyst of structural 
change in employment performance during the same period (Gera and Massé, 1996). In 
their study, Gera and Massé (1996), found that Canada’s transition to the knowledge-
based economy has been slow compared to other OECD countries. This so-called 
innovation gap is a cause of concern for Canada given the importance of these industries 
in wealth creation. The elaboration of policies in promoting the innovative capacity of a 
country has been advocated by many as an efficient means in joining the club of 
technologically advanced countries. 
 
 
The innovation gap is quite serious despite the fact that corporate R&D spending as a 
percentage of sales has been quite high for Canada. In a recent Survey of world’s top 
3002 international companies carried out by the Department of Trade and Industry in 
Britain (1998), Canada is well above average (10.8% compared to the average of 4.6%) 
and it is classified among the top three spenders after Denmark (16.3%) and ahead of 
Finland (10.4%). The U.S. on the other hand is faring relatively well just a bit above 
average (4.9%).  
 
                                                                 
2 The results may differ from the recent ones reported by StatCan and OECD. 
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Table 4 
Corporate R&D Spending as a % of Sales, 1997 
Denmark  16.3 Japan  4.8 
Canada 10.8 Germany 4.3 
Finland 10.4 France 4.1 
Sweden 8.0 Belgium 3.8 
Switzerland 6.3 South Korea 3.0 
Netherlands 5 Britain 2.5 
U.S. 4.9 Italy 2.0 
Average 4.6   
Source: U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, 1997 
 
 
Although these figures show that international competition in innovation is getting more 
intense, it is surprising to find out that the U.S. companies - the top performers in high-
tech innovation – are spending just around the international average, and countries such 
as Canada, Finland and Denmark – not widely associated with top innovations – to fair 
quite well on these grounds. This leads us to think that either the U.S. firms spend more 
on intangibles which are not included in R&D expenses or that the majority of 
innovations do not necessarily arise from large companies but small start-ups. 
 
 
Indeed, in a country where venture capital is widespread available (the average 
investment made by venture capital firms in the U.S. has doubled from $3.5 million in 
1992 to more than $7 million today) and the risks are well rewarded  no wonder to find 
more start-ups than in other countries, especially in telecommunications, computers, 
semiconductors, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. Further still, innovation in the 
U.S. is speared by the existence of  a huge pool of  diverse professional skills (chip 
designers, patent lawyers, software writers, high- tech marketeers, public relations 
experts, etc.), all the necessary and valuable expertise to bring the innovation to the 
market place. 
 
 
The five clusters of industries considered to be part of the new economy such as 
telecommunications, semiconductors, computers, medical equipment and 
pharmaceuticals are all present in the U.S. These industries are currently the ones  driving 
the present business cycle. Furthermore, global competition and shrinking product life-
cycles are forcing companies themselves to take a short term view of their research and 
development. This in turn shrinks the business cycle. Indeed, business cycles are getting 
shorter and shorter and this brings about the importance of firms and countries to jump on 
the bandwagon as early as possible. The chart below shows the shrinking life of the 
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business cycles, the first one lasted for 60 years and the fifth one (the current one) is 
expected to last 20 to 30 years only. 
 
 
Although we are yet not quite sure where we are on the current business cycle, it 
becomes important, nevertheless, to realise that an early ride of the trend is in the interest 
of every country, especially the developing ones. 
 
Chart 1 
Shortening Length of the Business Cycles 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
     
 
 
Research and development and  other innovation activities and investments in tangible 
and intangible assets are essential to growth and development. To be sure entrepreneurial 
activity alone is not enough without management capacities and the availability of 
venture capital and markets that reward risk. Many start-ups fail because their owners are 
unable to make the transition from entrepreneurs to managers. Basic research, although 
does not generate necessarily scientific discoveries, it is nevertheless important because it 
provides innovators with techniques for solving industrial problems. Basic research is 
also important because it helps to train people to think scientifically and create expertise 
in the use of investigative tools. 
 
 
A minimum of innovation is thus essential for a firm or a country should the latter be able 
to imitate and follow-up the scientific breakthroughs. Success in the market comes not 
only from just being an innovator but from being able to bring about improvements and 
establish a continuity or a trajectory of small technological adjustments and develop 
characteristics to be demanded by customers. The new growth models although in the 
right direction still lack flexibility and fail to take formally into account all these factors 
essential for growth. The next section elaborates the new growth theory in more detail. It 
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tries to identify and take into account the elements that may better explain the recent 
growth wave, especially the role of investments in intangible assets and other sorts of 
intellectual capital.  
 
III.  Growth theory and the AK Models 
 
The theory generally accepted in explaining economic growth stems from Solow’s (1956) 
seminal work on the production function.  According to this theory the output of an 
economy depends on the use of its inputs which are normally grouped into two major 
categories, labour and capital. Normally an increase in inputs leads to an increase in 
output. Due to the law of diminishing returns, the successive increases in output become 
less and less important as more labour is added to a given quantity of capital or more 
capital is added to a given quantity of labour. The markets (capital, labour and product 
markets) are assumed to be perfectly competitive.  
 
If this model were right it should have been observed a lower return on investment in 
industrialised countries for the second half of the 20th century compared to the first half.  
Moreover, the gap between rich and poor countries should have been narrowed. The 
stock of capital has been increasing over time in the most developed countries since the 
second world war. Instead of observing a fall in the returns on capital, we observed an 
increase of them. The change in technology accounts for the growth rates that cannot be 
explained by increases in capital and labour. Technological change was considered to be 
an exogenous factor capable of explaining the discrepancies between the actual 
(observed) growth rates and the rates predicted by the theory.   
 
 
In recent years economists have tried to endogenize the process of technological change.  
Various models have been constructed and technological change has been the result of a 
complex way of interaction of factors related, first, to the industry structure (first 
generation models), and later, to the size of the firm. Other factors such as a firm’s 
interactions with customers, its suppliers and its extra- and intra- mural efforts were 
deemed important in seizing opportunities arising from the discovery of new product and 
production techniques. Innovations and the knowledge incorporated into them explain 
better why the returns on capital do not decline as more capital is added to the economy. 
The latter suffices to explain why poorer countries have not caught-up yet the growth 
rates of rich countries despite the ever increasing accumulation of capital in these 
countries. 
 
 
Innovation contributes to economic growth much more than the factors of production 
(capital and labour) can  account for. Apparently, innovation accounts for more than half 
of all economic growth. Given the sheer size of this factor in accounting for growth, 
countries and firms tend to develop strategies and laws that allow the innovative firms to 
reap the benefits of their innovations through patents, intellectual-property rights and 
trade secrets. Apparently, the more a firm invests in research and development (R&D) the 
higher its innovative index. Knowledge accumulated through this process is considered to 
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be the most important result of innovation. Knowledge accumulation and innovation 
process are better explained though through the creation of networks, the establishment 
of inter-relationships and feedback procedures with the firm’s clients, suppliers, 
competitors, government and Universities and research institutes. The old model which 
views innovation and knowledge creation as a pipeline is not adequate any more. This is 
especially true in the present context of rapid advances of sciences and technology whose 
impact is to render the economies more knowledge-based and globalised. The diffusion 
of new ideas and technologies give rise to new forms of competition and co-operation 
and provide better and faster ways to increase a country’s growth rate. These 
developments in the comprehension of the process of innovation gave rise to a new 
generation of growth models, called AK models3, which provide a better explanation to 
the observed growth rates of many industrialised and developing countries.  
 
 
According to AK models growth is endogenously generated and returns to capital do not 
diminish as capital stock increases. Without diminishing returns, a country can enjoy high 
growth rates even if it has a high capital stock. Thus, continued investments are 
consistent with continued growth. One important implication of AK models is that 
permanent changes in a country’s policies lead to permanent changes in  its GDP growth, 
when capital is viewed broadly to include intangible capital and human capital. One way 
to test this theory is to examine investment as a share of GDP and compare it to the 
growth rates of GDP for various countries over time. But before we do so it is important 
to present formally the AK models and their implications.   
 
 
The Simple AK Models 
 
 
The link between investment rates and growth rates is established by specifying the 
following utility function for a representative household which maximises its utility by 
choosing the optimal per capita consumption c and per capital investment in physical 
capital xkt and human capital xht in each period: 
 
max [ct, xt ]  å t=0bt U(ct)       (1) 
 
for 0 <b< 1 and t is an index for time.  This optimisation problem is subject to a resource 
constraint, a capital accumulation constraint and inequality constraints (Jones, Manuelli 
and Rossi, 1993; Barro and Sala- i-Martin, 1995; Jones and Manuelli 1997; McGrattan 
and Schmitz, 1998): 
 
ct + xkt  + xht = A kt  a ht  1-a       (2) 
 
kt+1  = (1 - d) kt + xkt        (3) 
                                                                 
3 Their name comes from the use of the simplest form of the production function, namely Y = AK, where A 
is a positive constant representing the economy’s level of technology and K is the economy’s stock of 
capital. 
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ht+1 = (1 - d) ht + xht        (4) 
 
 
 
ct ³ 0,  xkt ³ 0  and xht ³ 0       (5) 
 
 
given k0, where a is the share of physical capital in production, kt  and kh is the stock of  
physical capital and of human capital at time t, A is the level of technology, and d is the 
rate of depreciation for both capital stocks. The per capita output can be expressed as: 
 
 
y = A k a h 1-a         (6) 
 
 
where the exponents on the two accumulable factors sum to one (1), exhibiting thereby 
constant returns to scale (doubling the capital stock doubles the output). 
 
 
The production technology of equation (2) exhibits constant returns to scale, thus by 
doubling the inputs we get twice as much output. A country with a high capital stock is 
still able to continue to grow as long as it continues to invest in capital (both human 
(intangible) and physical). Households choose investments so that a constant ratio of 
human capital to physical capital is achieved, that is (1-a) / a.  The total output can thus 
be written as a linear function of k, i.e.; 
 
 
A ka h1-a  = A[(1-a) / a]1-a k       (7) 
 
and the output’s growth rate is equal to the growth rate of physical capital. 
 
  
If the level of technology does not change over time, this simple model clearly shows that 
the growth rate of output is a linear function of the growth rate of physical capital stock. 
Investments in capital (investment to GDP) lead to sustained output growth rates.  The 
link is thus clear between the investment rate and GDP growth rate.  The growth rate of 
physical capital and output at time t (gt) is obtained by dividing both sides of equation (3) 
by the current capital stock kt.  If the ratio h/k does not start at (1-a)/a it can rapidly adjust 
to this value if the inequalities (5) are not are binding. Once adjusted, the variables c, xk, 
xh, k and h all grow at a constant rate g which is given by: 
 
 
g = 1 - d + xk / k = 1 - d + A[(1-a) / a]1-a xk / y    (8) 
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The link between the rate of physical investment and growth is thus established. Higher 
capital stocks do not necessarily imply lower returns which discourage to provide 
investment incentives in physical capital. Higher rates of investment imply higher growth 
rates. Human capital rather than physical capital, however, is increasingly considered to 
be as the engine of growth. Despite the flexibility of the AK models and the fact that they 
take into account the human capital factor and they assume different technologies, their 
original implication that investment in physical capital is the engine of growth is not 
altered. Thus, it can be said that the main weakness of these models are that they fail to 
account explicitly for the contribution of each type of investment (human and physical 
capital) in the growth process4. 
 
 
Empirical Tests of the AK Models 
 
 
Although the earlier empirical tests of the AK models showed no signs of corroborating 
the theory (Jones, 1995), later tests have shown more encouraging results (McGrattan, 
1988). In examining cross-sectional data for an extended period of time for a range of 
countries, McGrattan (1988) has found that the main findings of AK models were correct. 
That is, there is a strong positive relationship between average investment rates and 
average growth rates. Countries with strong base in capital stock are not deterred from 
further investing in this stock since it entails a further growth in their GDP. Poor 
countries too can follow the same path of growth. Moreover,  government policies 
affecting the capital/output ratios and/or labour/leisure decisions may account for short 
term deviations from these trends.  
 
 
In a study done by McGrattan (1998) the finding that countries which promote 
investment in capital are also the ones that enjoy high growth rates was confirmed for 15 
OECD countries and three Asian non-OECD countries. This finding is especially correct 
for the post-war period and particularly during the most recent years, i.e., during the 
“fourth wave”. Any short term deviations from this trend is attributed to a change in 
government policies that affect the capital/output ratios and/or labour/leisure decisions 
(shifts in tax rates favouring certain type of investments, or in consumption taxes and 
changes in the mix of government spending), all affect the capital-output ratio and the 
supply of labour, affecting thereby the growth rate. 
 
 
Exception made for these changes in government policies, the average investment/output 
ratios for the OECD countries range from as low as 10% to as high as 20%.  After the 
war, most of these ratios were higher than 20%. In the meantime the average growth rates 
doubled, from about 1% to about 2% for the rich countries. The main implication of the 
AK models is also confirmed more starkly for the developing non-OECD Asian 
                                                                 
4  This is not, however, the main criticism of the AK models though.  The AK models have been criticised 
because of the explicit assumption of constant returns to scale (Jones and Manuelli; McGrattan and Schmitz 
1998).  
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countries, Korea and Taiwan which experienced phenomenal growth rates in the post war 
period (averaging about 6% per year) while investments as a share to GDP have grown 
significantly during the same period. 
 
 
This linear relationship has also been demonstrated empirically by Summers and Heston 
(1991) who examined the growth rate of gross domestic product per worker and 
investment share of gross domestic product for 125 countries.  Their findings are 
summarised in the following diagram which relates the investment share and growth rates 
of 125 countries ranked by annualised 25-year growth rates and then averaged in groups 
of 5 for the period 1960-1985.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 
The Cross-Country Relationship Between Investment and Growth  
 
Growth Rate (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
· 
· 
 
 
 
 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
 
· 
· 
 
 
 
Source: Summers and Heston (1991) 
 
 
The figure establishes a stark relationship between growth rates and investment rates. The 
investment rate of the slowest-growing countries have an average of around 7%, while 
the corresponding rate of the fastest-growing countries is close to 25% (the correlation 
among all the average rates is 0.87). In short, the AK growth models are empirically 
verified and they are able to make good predictions of a country’s growth rates from its 
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policies in investment. Higher investment rates coincide with higher growth rates, both 
across time and across countries5. 
 
 
Such an affirmation is also valid for the most recent data on the world economy. More 
recent data show that growth rates have been quite impressive in the past decade or so 
(1990 to 1997). Almost 15% of the countries for which data have been compiled have 
registered growth rates exceeding 6%, while half of the countries covered grew at rates of 
over 3%.  The most modest growth rates were registered by the high- income countries 
ranging in the average of 2.2% for the period. Although this performance is impressive 
indeed, it is much lower than the one registered by the low and middle-income countries. 
This finding seems to confirm the traditional growth models according to which countries 
with low stocks of capital are those with the higher potential for investment returns 
(diminishing returns to scale). The increase in capital mobility through the restructuring 
of financial systems and world wide deregulation has increased capital mobility and with 
it have grown the possibilities of growth and economic development. The table below 
summarises the GDP growth trend in the 1980s and 1990s around the world. 
 
 
Table 5 
GDP Growth in the 1980s and 1990s 
 Average Annual GDP Growth 
 1980-90 1990-97 
World 3.2 2.4 
Low income 4.4 3.9 
Middle Income  
Lower middle 
Upper Middle 
2.9 
4.9 
1.8 
2.8 
2.3 
3.4 
High Income 3.2 2.2 
Low & Middle Income 3.1 3.0 
East Asia and Pacific 
Europe & Central Asia 
Latin America & Carib. 
Middle east & N. Africa 
South Asia 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
7.5 
n.a 
1.6 
2.1 
5.6 
1.8 
9.4 
-4.3 
3.8 
2.9 
5.6 
2.0 
 
Source: World Bank, 1999 
 
 
                                                                 
5 In a recent article (Cole and Ohanian, 1999) stress the importance of the value of aggregate returns to 
scale in explaining the sources of shocks that lead to business cycles fluctuations. They conclude  that 
because of the difficulty economists encounter in distinguishing between constant returns and increasing 
returns, the ability to determine whether business cycle fluctuations are caused by technology shocks, 
preference shocks, monetary shocks or other shocks is limited. 
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Intellectual capital and its importance in creating intangible but highly valuable assets 
such as knowledge is the basis of the so-called “new economy”. Knowledge is the key 
factor in explaining the current innovation spree and stellar performance of most 
industrialised economies in terms of long-term growth and job creation. The structural 
changes that we are currently undergoing towards more technology- and skill- intensive, 
knowledge-based economy, lead to better and more productive jobs with important 
implications for long term growth and prosperity. 
 
 
More knowledge (better ideas) and skills as well as more physical capital (technology) 
provide the basis for better innovations and business ventures yielding thereby higher 
returns and creating more wealth. Apparently, the overall rate of return for some 17 
successful innovations realised in the 1970s in the U.S. averaged 56% (this is compared 
favourably to the 16% of average return on investment for all American business over the 
past 30 years). It is not surprising to find out that more than half of the current U.S. 
economic growth is realised by industries that barely existed a decade ago. This shift 
towards knowledge-based industries and the increasing emphasis on investments 
generating such a knowledge create substantial spillover benefits to other sectors of the 
economy, provide further incentives to business firms to invest in skills-creation and 
high-wage jobs and generate higher returns to capital and labour not available to other 
sectors of the economy. Innovation and knowledge creation thus play an ever increasing 
role in economic growth. 
 
  
 
V. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
 
The 1990s have been a period of  rapid economic expansion for much of the world 
despite the fall of world economic growth from 3.2% in the 1980s to 2.4% in the 1990s. 
Countries in the low-to-middle income range have shown the most rapid growth rates 
despite the turmoil of financial markets and setbacks from economic disruptions. High-
income countries on the other hand have had an average growth rate of only 2.2% for the 
same period. Traditional economic theory predicts that countries with low capital stocks 
are the ones with high potential for investment returns. This is mainly true because of the 
assumption made of diminishing returns on capital.  
 
 
If capital stock is considered in a broad sense to include both physical and intellectual 
capital the law of diminishing returns may not apply and this basic hypothesis can be 
removed from the models.  Indeed, the AK growth models do take into account both 
tangible and intangible capital and dismiss the assumption of diminishing returns. They 
succeed in that way to establish a positive relationship between growth rate and capital 
stock in broad sense. The higher the capital stock the higher the growth rate. Recent 
empirical studies confirm this relationship but they fail to make an explicit account of the 
contribution of intangible capital to growth. We argue that in the new, knowledge-based 
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economy growth depends on the capacity of a firm and a country to convert rapidly the 
knowledge into valuable new products with a high value-added content especially in the 
five key industrial sectors of computers, telecommunications and information, 
semiconductors, pharmaceut icals and biotechnology and medical equipment. Conditions 
such as the existence of efficient capital markets, venture capital for start-ups, and high 
rewards for risk undertaking and the existence of a pool of professional skills locally are 
all essential in converting ideas to commercially viable products. 
 
 
Developing countries lack a number of those essential elements and with them the 
capacity to realise high growth rates. Although catch-up programmes in innovation may 
have not worked in the past, policies aiming at developing the appropriate conditions and 
the supporting infrastructure to emulate the more advanced countries are worth pursuing. 
Success, however, depends on a multitude of factors which are absent from most 
developing countries. Laggards may found it impossible to leapfrog into the new wave of 
innovations, especially the countries that are far away from the current economic 
framework that made its proof. 
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